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THE ROLE OF UNION STRATEGIES
IN NLRB CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS
KATE BRONFENBRENNER*
Analyzing 1986-87 data from 261 NLRB ceriification election cam-
paigns, the author finds that tinion tactic variahles explain more of the
variance in eieciion outcomes than any other group of variahles, incltid-
ing employer tactics, hargaining tinit demographics, organizer back-
ground, election background, employer characteri.stics, and election
environment. The results suggest that unions can significantly improve
the probability of winning an election by using a rank-and-fik- intensive
organizing strategy. This strategy includes a reliance on person-to-
person contact; an emphasis on union democracy and representative
participation: the building of support for the first contract during the
organizing drive; the use of escalating pressure tactics; and an emphasis
on dignity, justice, and fairness rather than on hiead-and-butter issues.
T he 1980s was a decade of crisis for theAmerican labor movement marked by
plant closings, the increasing use of perma-
nent striker replacemetits, heightened in-
ternational competition, and devastating
organizitig defeats. Yet in this period of
crisis there were also several signs of a
possible resurgence in union organizing
success. Over ten thousand janitors won
tuiion recognition in Los Angeles; thou-
sands of clerical workers were organized at
major universities across the countr)'; tbe
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Work-
ers Union (ACTWU) was able to win a
*Kaic Bronfenbrfiiiifr is the Director of Labor
EducLiiion Research at the New York State School of
Industrial and Labor Relations, (Cornell UnivtTsUy.
Financial support lor ihis .siudy was provided by the
AFL-tJO Department of Organizing and the Institute
for Clollectivc Bargaining at the School of Iiidu.strial
and Labor Relations at Cornell University.
string of major manufacturing victories in
the Deep South; and a coalition of unions
led by tbe Sei"vice Employees International
Union (SEIU) and 1199 won representa-
tion rights at tbe fiercely anti-union Beverly
Enterprises, a national for-proflt nursing
home chain.
In the 1990s many local and national
unions increased their commitment to or-
ganizing by shifting botb financial and staff
resources from servicing existing members
The staiistical analyses described in this paper
were performed using the SYSTAT lilatistical package
{Version 4.0). Requests for details <if computer pro-
grams used to generate the results and inher perti-
nent information regarding the data and measures
used should he addressed to K;it«.- Bronienhii-nnfr,
207 Extension Building, New York Stale Schot)! of
industrial and Labor Relations. Cornell University,
Ithaca, NYHSftS. Proprietiiry arrangements with ihe
AFL-CIO preclude the sharing of ihc data.
Industrial and Ijtbor Relations Rei'imi, Vol. 50, No. 2 (January 1997). © by Cornell University.
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to external otganizing.' In 1995, newly
elected AFL-CIO leaders committed 20
millioti dollars to "orgatiize at a pace and
scale that is tinprecedented" (Sweeney,
Trumka, and Chavez-Thompson 1995:5).
Much previous indtistrial relations re-
search has analyzed the factors contribut-
ing to tbe labor movement's declining or-
ganizing success. Studies bave examined
how organizing outcomes are affected by
the political, economic, and legal climate;
individual workers' attitudes toward their
work and tbe labor movement; employer
characteristics and tactics; atid bargaining
tinil demographics.
Few of the previous sttidies. however,
have effectively examined tbe actual pro-
cess of a union organizing campaigti and
tbe influence of union practices and strat-
egies on certification election outcomes.
Most likely, these factors have been ignored
because of over-reliance on NLRB data,
which are limited to information on em-
ployer characteristics and election back-
grotind. Data on tmion characteristics and
tactics are considerably more difficult to
obtain, yet tbey are essential if we are to
fully understand the determinants of union
election outcomes.
Iti 1988, in cooperation with tbe Orga-
nizing Departtnent of the APL-CIO, I col-
lected a novel data set to analyze the factors
contributing to union success or failure in
certification election campaigns."^ Tbe pri-
mary aim of the research was to identify
which, if any, union strategies affected
union certification election outcomes, con-
trolling for the influence of election back-
ground, organizing climate, bargainitig unit
demographics, and employer cbaracteris-
tics and tactics. In this paper I analyze the
'AFL-CIO National Organizing Committee Meet-
ing. March 9, 1995, as well as individual interviews
with organizers, local officers, and organizing direc-
tors from SEIU. IBT, AFSCME, and UNITE.
-The .^ tudy examined both ihe organi/ing and the
first contract process in the private .sector. For infor-
mation on ihe first contract study, refer to
Bronfeiibrenner (19911); for information on public
sector organizing, see Bronfenbrcnner andjuravich
(1995. 1995a, and 1995b).
results of tbat research and discuss the
implications for unions.
Theoretical Framework
Most previous union organizing research
has been based on a unidirectional model
framing tbe union certificatioti election
outcome as a function of workers' propen-
sity to vote for the union, as influenced by
contextual variables (such as election type
or economic climate) and employer char-
acteristics and tactics (see, for example,
Cooke 1983).-' In a small number of stud-
ies, union actions have also been included
in equations predicting union organizing
success (Reed 1989; Maranto and Fiorito
1987). However, as Lawler (1990) argued,
most of these studies are based on the
assumption that union and employer ac-
tions only indirectly affect election out-
comes by moderating contextual influences
on the individual's propensity to vote for
the union. They tend to ignore how em-
ployers and unions adjust their strategies in
respotise to or in expectation of eacb other's
behavior, as well as the ability of union and
managemetit behavior to strategically af-
fect the broader organizing climate.
As Hurd and McElvaine (1988), Lynn
and Brister (1989), and Green and Tilly
(1987) found in ibeir interviews with union
organizers, many employer and union or-
ganizitig strategists specifically tailor tbeir
tactics to conform with bargaining unit
demographicsand tbe particular economic,
political, and social environment in which
each campaign takes place. Unions and
employers also may adjust tbeir strategies
in preparation for or in reaction to tactics
being used by the other side. In addition,
some union and employer tactics directly
affect the election outcome without being
filtered throtigh tbe individual voter, such
as contracting out work or union public
pressure campaigns against the NLRB.
^For an in-depth review of the research hterature
on the determinants of ceriification election out-
comes, see Bronfenbrenner (1993), l.awlcr (1990),
Wheeler and McCIendon (1991), and Fioriio and
Greer (1982).
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figure 1. Theoretical Model of the Certification Election Process.
Informed by Lawier's strategic choice
model of unionization, this study uses a
theoretical model positing that union cer-
tification election outcomes are a function
of interacting elements including the con-
textual background, union and employer
strategies, organizer background, the use
of a management consultant, and workers'
propensity to unionize. As diagrammed in
Figure 1, this model, like earlier models of
unionization outcomes, proposes that at
the center of the certification election pro-
cess are the individual union voters, who
come into the election with some predispo-
sition for or against unions. But a combina-
tion of contextual factors and union and
employer characteristics and strategies also
affects election outcomes. These factors
indirectly moderate the individtials' pro-
pensity to vote for the union, they interact
with other employer and union factors, and
they directly affect union and employer
strategies, which in turn affect the election
outcome.^
In the model presented here, contextual
factors such as the economic and political
•'Although .strategics themselves are not easily ob-
servable and therefore are dilTicull tc» (iperatinna1t7c
and test. Ihe taciics tlirotij^h which .strategies are
implemented tan he operationalized and tested.
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climate, election type, company profiiabil-
ity, unionization history, and the
individual's race and gender are all hypoth-
esized to directly influence a worker's pro-
pensity to vote for the union. In addition,
these contextual factors indirectly affect a
voter's decision hecause they influence
unions' and employers' organizing strate-
gies.
Unions and employers can also moder-
ate the impact of contextual variables
through tactics .such as legal actions lo get
a more favorable bargaining unit or elec-
tion date, or the union can target its orga-
nizing efforts to gain more favorable bar-
gaining unit demographics. Unions and
employers also directly affect how individual
voters perceive union effects on their work
or pay situation, and unions and employers
can alter workers' perceptions of the eco-
nomic and social risks of unionization. For
example, some unions use rank-and-file
volunteers from previously organized units
to visit workers at home to educate them
about the benefits of unionization and "in-
oculate" them against the employer cam-
paign. Similarly, employers may use cap-
tive audience meetings to convince their
employees that unions are a threat to their
job security.
Union and employer strategies also can
be directed at each other. Some are
proactive, such as the union running a
public media campaign to embarrass the
employer into staging a less aggressive cam-
paign. Others are reactive, such as the
employer setting up an employee involve-
ment committee to undercut union charges
that the employer is not listening to work-
ers' concerns.
This model also includes direct action
strategies by the union or the employer
that affect election outcomes without be-
ing filtered through the employee's pro-
pensity to vote for ihc union. For example,
an employer may stop an election by con-
tracting out bargaining unit work, or the
union may circumvent the NLRB by having
other unionized employees bargain for rec-
ognition based on a majority card check of
the unorganized unit.
Finally, this model includes separate vari-
ables for organizer background and em-
ployer use of a management consultant.
Both organizers and consultants can de-
velop and implement employer or union
strategies. In addition, through their back-
ground, personality, and behavior, these
individuals can affect workers' attitudes
aboul the union and the employer and
their propensity to vote ibr the union.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses tested in this study were
informed by case studies of successful union
campaigns, as well as discussions with orga-
nizers, labor leaders, and labor educators
and my ten years" experience as a union
organizer and negotiator. Case evidence
suggests that iiniou success in organizing
depends on running campaigns with a fo-
cus on representative leadership, personal
contact, dignity and justice, and building
an active union presence in ihe workplace
from the very beginning of the campaign.''
Tiiese campaign tactics make up what I and
others refer to as a "rank-and-file inteii.sive
strategy." A rank-and-file strategy increases
the likelihood of iniion electoral success
because it generates the worker participa-
tion and commitment necessary to with-
stand aggressive employer anti-union cam-
paigns (which are now commonplace) and
to counteract any anti-union aspects of the
economic, political, and legal climate.
A rank-and-File intensive organizing strat-
egy has six basic components. Below, I
describe the comp<jnentsand state hypoth-
eses for each.
Compoiient I. Reliance on a slow, under-
ground, person-to-person campaign using
housecalls, small group meetings, and pre-
union associations to develop leadership
and union commitment, and prepare work-
ers for employer anti-union strategies be-
fore the employer becomes aware of the
campaign.
•*See Green and Tilly (1987), Hurd (1988, 1989),
Felonte and Braden (1990), and Lynn and Brister
(1989) for case studies ihat cite examples of these
kinds of tainpaigiis and campaign strategies.
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Hypothesis la: Percent signed cards
(+). The percent cards variable
measures the degree of organizing
the union engaged in prior to fil-
ing the election petition. I hypoth-
esize that the greater the percent-
age of the bargaining unit the union
signs up on cards before the elec-
tion petition is filed, the greater
the personal contact the union has
made with individual workers and
the greater the likelihood that the
tmion has been able to educate
workers about the union and in-
oculate them against the employer's
anti-iuiion campaign before that
campaign is launched.
Hypothesis Ib: Number of small
group meetings (+). This variable
assesses the number of small group
meetings the union held in work-
ers' homesor local gathering places
during the campaign. 1 hypoth-
esize that the number of small
group meetings will be positively
related to tmion election success
because it is an indicator of the
intensity of the union's effoits as
well as the degree of personal con-
tact the union made with bargain-
ing unit members during the cam-
paign.
Hypoihesi.s Ir: Fifty percent or more
of unit housecalled (+). This vari-
able is based on the percentage of
the unit housecalled prior to the
election. I hypothesize that unions
will have more success when they
housecall the majority of the unit
because housecalling represents
intensive personal contact. In their
homes workers are able to frankly
discuss their concerns and ques-
tions free from employer surveil-
lance and intimidation and free
from the time constraints inherent
in workplace discussions. To
housecall 50% or more of the unit,
unions must track down the names
and addresses of these workers.
Thus this variable provides an im-
portant measure of the energy, staff,
and volunteer resources the union
commits to organizing, and it also
measures the degree of personal
contact with the bargaining unit.
Hypothesis Id: Number of union
letters mailed (-). This variable
measures tbe number of letters
mailed by the union to bargaining
unit members during the organiz-
ing campaign. It is a proxy for a
traditional organizing drive in
which the emphasis is placed on
gate leafletting and letters rather
than personal contact. I hypoth-
esize tbat the more letters the union
mails out, the fewer are the re-
sources available for a rank-and-
file intensive campaign.
Component 2. A focus on active rank-and-
file participation in and responsibility for
tbe organizing campaign, including a large
rank-and-file organizing committee repre-
sentative of the different interest groups in
the bargaining unit.
Hypothesis 2: Representative orga-
nizing committee (+). This vari-
able captures bow representative
the in-plant organizing committee
is of the bargaining unit as a whole.
I hypothesize that imions using rep-
resentative rank-and-file commit-
tees will be more successful in cer-
tification elections because they will
be more in touch with the issues
and concerns of the bargaining
tinit, they will have better access to
workers in the workplace, and they
will be able to demonstrate to the
workers that they are a democratic
and inclusive organization.
Component 3. A long-run campaign strat-
egy that incorporates pressure for a first
contract in the original organizing process.
Hypothesis 3a: Percent of unit that
did contract survey (+). This vari-
able measures the percentage of
the tniit tbat completed a contract
survey through personal contact
with a committee member or a
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union staff member before the cer-
tification election. It does not in-
clude contract surveys distributed
through the mail or gate leafietting,
because those surveys can be com-
pleted witbout personal contact. I
hypothesize that unions seeking
information regarding the issues
individual bargaining unit mem-
bers want addressed in the first con-
tract will be more able to build
worker commitment to the union.
Hypothesis 3b: Bargaining commit-
tee established before the election
(+). As with the contract survey
variable, I hypothesize that estab-
lishing a bargaining committee
before the certification election
builds worker confidence that the
union is going to win the certifica-
tion election and successfully bar-
gain a first agreement, thereby in-
creasing bargaining unit support
for the tuiion during the certifica-
tion election campaign.
Component 4. Inside and outside pres-
sure tactics to build worker commitment
and compel the employer to run a fair
campaign.
Hypothesis 4: Solidarity days u.sed
( + ). Solidarity days are union-des-
ignated days on which supporters
are asked to wear union buttons,
hats, t-shirts, arm bands, or other
union insignia to build commit-
ment among the membership and
actively demonstrate union support
and solidarity to the employer. I
hypothesize that these actions aid
the union's efforts by reinforcing
commitment among pro-union
workers and by helping to convince
undecided voters that they can
safely support the union. The pub-
lic show of support also makes it
more difFicult for the employer to
intimidate workers one-on-one and
to argue that only a small group of
troublemakers support the union's
campaign.
Component 5. An emphasis during the
organizing campaign on issues such as re-
spect, dignity, fairness, and service quality
that go beyond the traditional bread-and-
butter issues of wages, fringes, benefits,
and job security.
Hypothesis 5: Union used new issues
(+). This variable captures whether
the union focused on issues such as
dignity, fairness, and input into
service and product quality rather
than only traditional issues such as
wages, benefits, working condi-
tions, and job security. I hypoth-
esize that unions will have greater
success when they focus on these
"new issues" than when they simply
rely on traditional bread-and-but-
ter issues during ihe campaign.
Component 6. An emphasis on develop-
ing a culture of organizing that permeates
the union. This includes a serious commit-
ment of staff and financial resources to
organizing, the involvement of staff from
the international union in local luiion or-
ganizing campaigns, and the use of rank-
and-file volunteers from already organized
bargaining units.
Hypothesis 6a: Rank-and-file volun-
teers did housecalls (+). This vari-
able captures whether the union
used rank-and-file volunteers from
other organized workplaces to cam-
paign among bargaining luiit mem-
bers. Organized workers from the
same union can effectively carry
the union's message during an or-
ganizing campaign.
Hypothesis 6b: Individual Union
Variables: IBT (-), USWA (-), UAW
(+),SEIU{ + ),UFCW(+). Iinclude
the individual union variables in
the model in an attempt to control
for aspects of union culture and
other union characteristics that
have not been captured by the
union tactic variables in the model.
Unfortunately, including variables
for all 29 unions would severely
limit the degrees of freedom in the
statistical analyses. Hence, I re-
stricted the individual union vari-
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ables to the 5 unions in the sample
that had at least 20 elections. These
5 unions (IBT, USWA, UAW, SEIU,
and UFCW) cover over 50% of the
elections in the sample.
A positive sign is hypothesized
for SEIU and the UAW because
these unions appear to have made
a strong commitment to organiz-
ing as reflected in training, re-
sources, and membership educa-
tion. For the IBT and the USWA I
hypothesize a negative sign, because
when these elections took place in
1986-87, neither union had made
organizing a strong priority.'' A
negative sign is also hypothesized
for the UFCW. Although that union
has devoted large amounts of fi-
nancial resources to orgatiizing,
some of the larger local unions
appear to have failed to adapt their
organizing strategy to meet the
needs and concerns of the women
and minority workers who domi-
nate the retail food industry work
force. In addition, the growing
emphasis by the UFCW on circum-
venting the NLRB by using non-
bargaining unit members to picket
for recognition has made grass-
roots-level NLRB campaigns less of
a priority for the tinion.
Data
The data used in this study include a
survey conducted by the AFL-CIO of 189
union NLRB certification election cam-
paigns in units of over 50 eligible voters
that took place betweenjuly 1986 andjune
''Both uniutis have had major changes in ihrir
oi'^ani/in^ operations .since the sur\'ey took place.
With thf eltction of Ron (^arey. orgaiii/ing has be-
come one ol the top priorities of ihe Teamsters, with
the iiUernational taking over much ol [he organizing
formally under the exclusive jurisdiciion of the lo-
cals. In the last few years the USWA has launched a
nationwide organizer training program for USWA
siaffaiid transferred new or^janizer rccriiitmeni and
training decisions from the District directors to the
AKI.-CIO Organizing Institute.
1987 (AFL-CIO 1989). The original AFL-
C>IO sample exchided or under-represented
several major unions, especially those orga-
nizing in the service sector. For the filial
sample in this study, I corrected for these
problems by adding a random sample of 72
HERE, SEIU, IBT, ACTWU, and HHCE
1199 campaigns to the AFL-CIO sample.
With this addition, the combined sample is
representative across unions, indtistries,
regions, and unit types. A follow-up qties-
tionnaire was sent out to the participants in
the AFL-CIO survey asking more detailed
questions regarding organizer background,
bargaining unit demographics, and tactics
used to gain a first contract.'
The final sample is restricted to single
union NLRB elections involving AFL-CIO
affiliates in units of 50 or more eligible
voters." Organizers from 29 different AFL-
CIO affiliates participated in the survey.
The 261 elections in the sample cover
slightly less than a third of the 961 AFL-CIO
affiliate single union elections in units over
50 held during the sample period. In addi-
tion to the union tactic variables specified
in the various hypotheses, the equations
include as controls variables that measure
the following: election background, elec-
tion environment, company characteristics,
unit demographics, organizer background,
and company tactics. The definition,
source, and hypothesized sign for each of
these variables are provided in Table 1."
'When organisers were unable or unwilling to
answer que.stions in the follow-up survey, the mis.sing
data were recorded in the following manner. For
dummy variables measuring theexistence of a charac-
teristic or the use of a tactic, thf variable was coded as
0. For all continuous variables the variable WHS coded
as the mean respon.se of all other cases for that
variable. The model was tested after eliminating .ill
case.s with any missing data, and the results were tht-n
stronger or the same for eveiT variable that had
stati.stically significant effects. Filling in the missing
data, thus, does not appear to bias the results, and it
allows more cases to be included in the sample,
"NLRB multi-union electictnsand elections involv-
ing non-AFI.-ClO affiliates involved less than 1% of
the total NI.RB elections during this period,
''For an in-depth discussion ot the rationale and
hypothesized impact of each of thf,se variabU-.s, nee
Brunfenbrcnner (1993), pp. 245-61.
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Methods
In order to compare the result.s of this
study wilh the findings of other bargaining
unit-level election studies, in this study I
use as a dependent variable both the pro-
portion of votes received by the union in
the election (Equation 1) and a dichoto-
mous win-lose variable (Equation 2) as de-
pendent variables.
Because the percentage union vote is a
bounded by zero and one, weighted least
squares is the preferred multi-variate statis-
tical method when ihe dependent variable
is the proportion of votes received by the
union (Maranto and Fiorito 1987; Reed
1989). It is also generally accepted that
logit is tbe appropriate estimator for a bi-
nary dependent variable such as win-lose
(Aldrich and Nelson 1984). Therefore,
Equation i uses weiglited least squares and
measures the dependent variable as the log
odds ratio of tbe percentage union vote or
ln[/j/Y - p)], with each variable in the
model weighted by the square root of the
inverse of the variance, y74A',/i,(y-/;)].'"
Equation 2 is estimated by a log-likeli-
hood function in which the dichotomous
dependent variable of union win = 1 and
union lose = 0 is a function of y/[Y +
exp( xP) ], where x is the vector of indepen-
dent variables and P is a vector ot logit
coefficients.
Results and Discussion
Overall, the two equations (WLS and
logit) provide approximately equal explana-
tory power regarding factors contributing
to union success in certification elections.
As shown in Table 2, tbe WLS equation with
the log odds ratio of the percentage union
vote as the dependent variable is statisti-
cally significant at a level of less than .001,
with an adjusted R-squared of .438 and an F
'"As noted by Aldrich and Nelson (1984) and
Maddala (1983), when each variable on both sides of
the eqiiaiion is weighted by ihc .square root of ihe
inserse ol the variance, tht- dependem variable is no
longer limited, and problems with heteroskcdasticity
are avoided.
statistic of 5.807. The logit equation with
the dummy dependent variable of I =iuiion
win and 0 = union lose is statistically signifi-
cant at a level of less than .001, with a
McFadden's Rho-squared of .469 and a log
likelihood ratio of 167.080.
Perhaps the most important finding in
this study is that the union tactic variables
as a group explain a greater part of tbe
variance in election outcome than any other
elementsofthe certification election model,
That is, not only do union tactics matter,
but as a group they matter more than em-
ployer tactics, bargaining unit demograph-
ics, organizer background, or organizing
climate.
The relative importance of union tactics
is shown in Table 4, where each of the
estimated equations is broken down into
the different elements of the certification
election model, including contextual vari-
ables, organizer background variables,
management tactic variables, union tactic
variables, and individual union variables.
The contextual variables are broken down
still further by election background, elec-
tion environment, employer characteris-
tics, and bargaining unit demographics. In
Table 4. nine different WLS and logit equa-
tions were used to test portions of the model.
In each equation the independent vari-
ables were limited to the variables for each
element of tbe complete model. Thus one
equation only included union tactics as
independent variables, another only indi-
vidual union variables, and the remaining
equations included organizer background,
management tactics, and contextual fac-
tors. The contextual factors variable was
then further separated into its component
parts, including variables measuring elec-
tion background, election environment,
company characteristics, and unit demo-
graphics. Tbe R^  and, in the logit equa-
tions, tbe Rho^ for each of the equations
can be compared both to the results for the
other portions of the model and to the
results for the complete model.
In the Wl.S equation, the adjusted R-
squared for union tactics (.276) was higher
than the adjusted R-squared for any of the
other elements of the model. In the logit
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Tahle 2. Descriptive Statistics for Ihe Certification Election Model.
\ndrpfndtnt Xarmblr
Hyfiolhnizfd Sample Mean Prrfetit Win
Si^n or Propurlinn Ratf
Variable
Union Tactics
Rcpr<-,sf niiitivf organizing Cdmmitiee
PcMcni signed rards
5(1% or more of Unit l
Riuik-iinci-lilc voliinieers did
Nuinbcr of small n'*>iip
Sdlicl^rily days used
Pcrtenl iinil did contract survey
Bargaining coininitiee brfort election
NiiinlK-r of iniion U'lters
Uniiiii use<l nrw is.siie.s
Individual Unions
IBT
UFCW
USWA
UAW
SERi
Conicxtual Factors
EIrrliiin hnekgionnd
N limber t)f eligiblt- voters
I'nit different from peiiiiuii uniE
Number of days between peiition
and elfciion
Ktn'ironmmtfil farlors
Percent iinemploynicni rate
Percent iinioi) densiLy
Company rkararleii^lif,\
Unit in inaniifin tiiring sector
Company profitable
Pre-cainpaign benefits good
Pif-canipaign QWI. plan
OlliiT iiniis iirgani/ed
Hiirirniriitif; unit firmitgrriphifs
Averagi' wage $5 per lioiir or less
Averaf^e age ol unit
60% or more wnmen in unit
Percent i)iini>riiv in unit
Organizer Background
1-5 years rank-and-J'ile experience
Organizer Irom international tinion
Organizer has cnllege degree
Organi;^er female or minority
Organizer's parents middle class
EmployerTactics
Management ronsiiltant used
Discharged workers not reinstated
C^oiiipany gave wage increase
Company made promises
Anti-tinion committee used
Ntimber o( captive audience meetings
Ntimber of company letters
.23
.60
.28
.18
5.26
,12
32.19
.15
4.14
.27
.14
.12
.12
.11
.09
:i8.oo
.22
79.2.T
7.16
20.79
.66
.84
.26
.07
.46
.41
32.77
.39
.28
.16
.47
.26
.25
.17
.71
.18
.30
.56
.42
5.50
4.47
.62 (.36)
NA
.61 (.S5)
.b'Z (,40)
NA
.->?> (,41)
NA
.64 (.39)
NA
..76 (.37)
.28 (,45)
.50 (.41)
.23 (,45)
.46 (.42)
.61 (45)
NA
.22 (.47)
NA
NA
NA
..H9 (.47)
.40 (.53)
.37 (.44)
.22 (.44)
.49 (.38)
.56 (.33)
NA
..•iS (.36)
NA
.67 (.38)
.43 (.42)
.42 (.43)
.56 (.38)
.36 (.44)
.40 (.50)
.37 (.44)
.32 (.47)
.34 (.54)
.37 (.46)
NA
NA
flor 1
0-1.78
0 or 1
0 or 1
f 1-100
Oor 1
0-100
Oor 1
0-50
0 or 1
Oor I
Oor 1
Oor I
Oor 1
Oor I
46-650
Oor 1
2-881
2.1-17.7
S.8-42.9
Oorl
Oor 1
Oor 1
O o r l
Oor 1
Oor 1
19-55
Oor 1
0-1
Oor 1
Oor 1
Oor 1
Oor 1
O o r l
Ooi 1
0 or i
Oor 1
O o r l
Oor 1
0-200
()-50
'Percent win rate is listed for all dtimmy variables when the variable = I (win rate for variable = 0 in parentheses).
equation, the contextual variable group
has a slightly higher Rho-sqiiared (.187)
than does union tactics (.169); but with
that one exception, the Rho-squared for
union tactics exceeds that for all the other
elements, and union tactics continues to
explain more then twice as much of the
variance as any of the subcategories of con-
textual variables, including election back-
ground, election environment, employer
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Table 3. Determinants of Election Oulcomes. Wl.S and I.ogit Estimations of Election Outcome
Models for Two Dependent Variables: Log Odds Ratio of Perceni Union Vote and Wiii-I.ose.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
[ndfprndml Viirinblr
Union Tactics
Repix'Ncn(alive or^^ni/iiig cominiturc
Perceni .signed cards
50% or more of unit housecalled
Rank-nnd-fllo volunieers did liimspcal
Number of small group mceiings
Solidarity days used
Perceni unit did coniraci survey
Bargaining coinmitlcc before election
Number of union letitrs
Union riscd nfw issues
Individual Unions
SEIU
UAW
UFCW
IBT
USWA
Comexiual Factors
Electtim background
Number ot eligible voters
Unii diflcrt^ni from petition unit
Number ol days between peiiiion
and election
EnvtTonmmUil fatlriis
Pertent unemploynieni rate
Percent union density
Company rluirnrlmslifi
Unii in manulaciuring sector
Company prolltable
Pre-cainpaign benefits good
Pre-campaign QWL plan
Oiher units organized
Batgainin/r unit demographics
Average wage $5 per liiiur or less
Average age of unit
60% or more women In unit
Percent minority in unit
Organizer Background
I-.') vpius' rauk-;ind-tile experience
Organiser Irom international union
Organi/er has college degree
Organizer female or minority
Organizer's parents middle class
Employer Tactics
Management consultant used
Discharged workers not reinstated
Company gave wage increase
Company made promises
Anti-union committee used
Ntimber of captive audience meetings
Number of company letters
Intercept
Total number of observations
Adjusted R'^
F "
*StalislicalIy significant at the .10 level: **at the .05 level; • • •a t the ,01 level (one-tailed tests).
Wfigliird Least Squares
l.og{% V nion Vote)
Standardized Coeffidrnt
0,108**
0.716***
-0.021
0,010
0 . 1 1 r>**
0.189***
0.079
0.162'**
-0,205***
0.188***
0.100*
0.084*
n.030
-O.t90«^*
-(),0li2
-0.085
-0,081
0.214***
0.187
-0.078
0,006
-0,314***
-0.008
-0,068
0.122**
0,0.'>6
-0.620**
0.012
0.137'*
0.051
-(1-117
-O.241'"*
(1.072
-0.019
-0,071
-0,038
-0.145**
-0.058
-0,207***
-0.126**
-0.1.fiO**
-0.014
261
0.438
5.807
(0.101)
(0.2S7)
(0.092)
(0.101)
(0.004)
(0.122)
(0.001)
(0.103)
(0.009)
(0.082)
(0.149)
(0.131)
(0.134)
(0,142)
(0.120)
(0.000)
(0,087)
(0,000)
(0.014)
(0.006)
(0.099)
(0,096)
(0.087)
(0,135)
(0,077)
(0.088)
(0,006)
(0.085)
(0.127)
(0.107)
(0.083)
(0.09.5)
(O.086)
(0,103)
(0,093)
(0.100)
(0.082)
(0,076)
(0,073)
(0,003)
(0.009)
(0,364)
Rho-squared
l-ogt'l Win-Lose
Coe/Jirient
0,189
4.085***
0.682'
0.548
0.020
1,213*
0.01 !•*
1.173'*
-0.051
1.265**'
0.442
0.117
-0.401
-1,308*
-1,579
-0.007***
-1.279**
0.007***
0,174**
0.066**
0289
-0.931**
0,772
-1.929**
0.945'**
0,886**
- 0 . 0 8 2 " *
0.879*'
2.334"»*
l ,14fi ' '
0,831 • '
-1,172
0,586
-0,491
-0.246
-0,689
-0,777*
-1,154***
-0,012
-0.124***
-0 .102 '*
-2.706*
261
= 0.469
(0.562)
(1.420)
(0.495)
(0.517)
(O.Olfi)
(0.810)
(O.OOfiJ
(0.633)
(0.059)
(0.477)
(0.940)
(0,61)9)
(0.641)
(0,819)
(0.706)
(0,003)
(0,556)
(O.(H)3)
(0,082)
(0,033)
(0.548)
(0,545)
(0.480)
(0.918)
(0.453)
(0.500)
(0.035)
(0.507)
(0.706)•
(0.622)
(0.481)
(0.607)
(0.478)
(0..584)
(0.494)
(0.623)
(o.r>oo)
(0.430)
(0.442)
(0,041)
(0,052)
(1.996)
2 (Log-likelihood) = 167.081)
Partinl Derivntivf
0,022
0.475
0.079
0.064
0,002
0.141
0.001
0.136
-0.006
0.147
0.051
0.014
-0,047
-0.152
-0.184
-0.001
-0.149
0.001
0.020
0.008
0.034
-0.108
0.090
-0.224
0.110
0.103
-0.010
0.102
0.271
0.1.W
0,197
-0.136
0.068
-0.057
-0.029
-0.080
-0.090
-0.134
-0.001
-0.014
-0.012
-0.315
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Table 4. Breakdown of R^  and
F Tests for Portions of ihc Model.
(Rho-S(|itared and Log-likelihood
Ratios Are Included lor the Logii Equation)
•-
Variable Categories
t'niun Tactics
Individual I'nions
All (^onttrxiual
Factors
Election
Backgi [itiiiH
Eleciiiin
Environment
Company
Charncteri sties
Unit
Demograpliica
Organ iicr
Ilackgiuund
Maiiagcmeni Tanic-i
Weighted Least
.Sqtiares Log
f% Union
Vole/%
No Vote}
0.276
0,137
0,241
0.193
1), 123
0.1.15
0.171
0,162
0,155
f
9.927
7.698
6.425
16.122
12,873
7.607
1 1.509
9.200
6.823
Logit
Win-Lose
RHO^
0.169
0.037
0.187
0.073
{(.(IO«
0.035
0.070
0.055
0-057
I.LR
60,163
I3 .347- '
66.410
2.^ 1.858
2-908
12 .628"
24.958
19.619
20.220**
Signi f icance levels of p values for F tests a n d L.og-
likelihood Ratios: MO; •*-()5; ***-01.
characteristics, and bargaining unit demo-
graphics.
Results for Union Variables
The descriptive statistics suggest that in-
dividual union tactics play an important
role in determining election outcomes. As
shown in Tahle 2, the components of a
"rank-and-file intensive strategy" are asso-
ciated with union win rates that are 12—26%
higher than union win rates in campaigns
that do not employ that strategy. Union
win rates are highest in units where the
union used campaign tactics such as repre-
sentative committees (62%, versus 36%
where there was not a representative com-
mittee), where 50% or more of the unit was
housecalled (61%.versus35%), where there
was a bargaining committee before the elec-
tion (64%, versus 39%), and where the
union used new issues (56%, versus 37%).
Win rates are also higher in elections where
rank-and-file volunteers did housecalls
(52%, versus 40%) and the union used
solidarity days (53%, versus 41%).
As shown in Table 3, the coefficients are
positive and statistically significant at a level
of .05 or better in one or both of the equa-
tions for eight out of the ten union cam-
paign tactic variables: representative com-
mittee, percent cards, 50% or more
housecalled, number of small group meet-
ings, solidarity days, percent of the unit
surveyed, bargaining committee chosen
before the election, and focus on new is-
sues. There are also negative and statisti-
cally significant results for the number of
union letters variable.
In addition, variables measuring some
elements ihat were present in only a small
number of campaigns, such as rank-and-
file volunteers, exhibited positive and sta-
tistically significant results when included
in a reduced model that excluded the five
union control variables as well as five other
variables—manufacturing sector, whether
the organizer has 1-5 years' rank-and-file
experience, whether the organizer has a
college degree, whether the organizer's
parents are middle-class, and whether the
employer used a consultant—that were hy-
pothesized and found to be of limited im-
portance to the certification election pro-
cess. Excluding variables from tbe esti-
mated equations did not change tbe sign of
any of the statistically significant variables,
but it did bring to a statistically significant
level, or increase the statistical significance
of, several key variables that had low sample
frequency rates, including the variables for
whether 50% or more of the unit was
housecalled and whether rank-and-file vol-
unteers did housecalls.
In the estimated logit equation, the par-
tial derivatives of . 136 for bargaining com-
mittee before the election, .141 forsolidar-
ity days, and . 146 for tbe use of new issues by
the union suggest that holding all other
variables constant, the probability of the
union winning the election increased 14%
when the union used solidarity days or es-
tablished the bargaining committee before
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the election and 15% when it focused on
new issues. The partial derivatives of .079
for 50% or more of the unit housecalled
and .064 for housecalls by rank-and-file
volunteers suggest a 6~H% increase in the
probability of winning the election where
either of these tactics was used by the union.
For ever\'additional 10% of the bargaining
unit surveyed one-on-one regarding what
they wanted in the first contract, the esti-
mated partial derivative of .001 suggests
that the probability of winning the election
increased by 1%."
The positive and statistically significant
coefficients on the rank-and-File intensive
tactic variables, together with the negative
iuid statistically significant coefficients on
ihe number of union letters variable, con-
firm the hypothesis that unions are more
likely to win certification elections when
they run campaigns using a rank-and-fiie
intensive organizing strategy, including a
reliance on person-to-person contact; an
emphasis on union democracy and repre-
sentative participation; the building for the
first contract during the organizing drive;
the use of escalating pressure tactics; and
an emphasis on dignity, jtistice. and fair-
ness rathei- than solely bread-and-butter
issues.
With the exception of the UFCW, all of
the individual union variables exhibited
their hypothesized sign in both equations
and were statistically significant at a level of
.10 or better in at least one equation. The
strong results for the IBT variable demon-
strate that the deficiencies of the Teamster
election campaigns were not captured well
by the union tactic variables. The weaker
results for the other union control vari-
ables may arise because the organizing be-
havior of these unions is captured well by
the union tactic variables.'- Yet the fact that
four out of the five union variables have
statistically significant coefficients in at least
one of the estimated equations is consis-
tent with the hypothesis that the overall
"organizing culttne" of the union, inde-
pendent o[ union tactics, plays a role in
determining the outcome of certification
elections.
"Standardizfd cDcfficit-nts are used in the WLS
model becaii.se it is difficult tci interpret the indi-
vidual effects (}f the independent variables on the
propcirlion of votes received by the union in an
equation in which the dependent variable, a lo}» odds
I atio, is based on a non-linear iran.sformation. H(iw-
ever, the siandardi/ed coefficients do permit us to
compare the relatively stronp; effetts of the union
tactit variables to the influence of the other variable.s
in ihe model. In order to estimate the independent
effects of union tactic vaiiables on percent union
vote. I also te.sted the model u.siiif^  Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS). The OLS results aie ton.sistent with
the logit and WLS resuksand suj^ gest that contrtiUing
lor the effect of other variables, the percent union
vote would increase 6% in units with a rank-and-file
oigani/ing committee repre.sentativeof the different
intere.st groups in the bargaining unit, 10% in uiiiLs
where solidarity days were used. '^% in uniis where the
bargaining committee was established before the elec-
tion, and 8% in campaigns where the union focused
on dignity and ju.stite rather than bread-and-butter
issues, (iiven thai in moi e than 11 % of the campaigns
in ihe sample the tniion lost the election by a margin
of !}% or less, the.se re.sults suggest that if unions
began to use all or most of these rank-and-file inten-
sive campaign tactics, they could .significantly im-
prove their election win races.
Control Variables
All but three of the 26 control variables
had estimated coefficients with the hypoth-
esized sign in both equations, and the esti-
mated coefficients on 20 of the 26 variables
were statistically significant at a level of .05
or better in at least one of the equations.
As other studies have found, this analysis
suggests that the strongest contextual vari-
ables are the employer characteristics and
bargaining unit demographic variables,
which refer specifically to the unit being
organized. The probability of the union
winning the election declined by 11% in
profitable companies and 22% in compa-
nies with some kind of participation pro-
positive (though not significant) results for
the UFCW variable migbt be explained by the fact
that the UFCIW campaigns in ihe sample included a
much higher percentage of wins than are found in ihe
UFCW election population as a whole, and therefore
may not be representative of the UFCW orgHni/.hig
record.
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gram in effect before the union drive. The
probability ofwinning an election increased
by 9% in low-wage units and in units with a
majority of women, and improved by 3%
for every 10 percentage point inciease in
the unit's minority represeiiiation. Unions
also did better in workplaces where other
units were organized, with the probability
of winning the election increasing by 9% in
those units.
Also consistent with the results of other
.studies is my finding that union.s did par-
ticularly poorly in campaigns where the
board or courts made unit changes after
the election petition was filed, with the
probability of winning the election declin-
ing by 15% in tbose units. As predicted, win
rates also declined dramatically as unit size
increased, with the union's probability of
winning tbe election decreasing by 7% for
every 10 additional voters added to the
unit.
In contrast to these firm-specific contex-
tual variables, the broader environmental
variables such as unemployment and union
density exhibited much weaker effects on
both union vote and election outcome.
The results for the management tactic
variables corroborate earlier studies show-
ing the important influence of employer
tactics on the percent union vote or elec-
tion outcome. More than 75% of the em-
ployers in the sample engaged in active
anti-union campaigns including some com-
bination of discharges, captive audience
meetings, supervisor one-on-one meetings
with individual employees, wage increases,
promises of improvements in wages, hours,
or working conditions, promotions of union
leaders, anti-union committees, small group
meetings, letters, and leaflets. The esti-
mated coefficients on all of these manage-
ment tactic variables bad a negative sign as
hypothesized, and with the exception of
the consultant and discharge variables, all
of the management tactics variables were
statistically significant in at least one of the
equations.'^
As a group, the organizer background
variables played a much less important role
in determining union election success than
did most of the other elements of the certi-
fication election model. Thisdemonstrates
Iliat organizer training and philosophy,
variables captured by the union tactic and
individual union variables, play a more
important role in determining election
outcome than do the traits of the individual
organizers.
The estimated coefficients on the inter-
national organizer variable show that the
probability of the nnion winning the elec-
tion increased by close to 20% in units
where the organizer was on the interna-
tional union's staff. The international or-
ganizer variable may be a prosy for orga-
nizer training and experience, and for tbe
commitment of international resources.'••
Tbe small and statistically insignificant
coefficients on the organizer female and
minority variables may be due to the ex-
tremely small number of female and mi-
nority organizers in the sample (12%
women. 15% minority). Alternatively, it
also may be dne to the correlation between
union tactics and the union propensity to
hire female and minority organizers. That
is, female and minority organizers may not
be inherently better organizers than white
male organizers, but rather tbe luiions tbat
are willing to hire female and minority
organizers may be more likely to run rank-
and-file intensive campaigns. When the
estimated model is reduced to 31 variables,
however, the female minority lead orga-
nizer variable does become statistically sig-
nificant at a level of .10 in both the WLS
and the logit equations. Thus female and
minority organizers not only are a proxy for
a more detailed discussion ol the manage-
meni tactics findings in this stndy and their implica-
tions for labor law reform, see Bronfenbrenner (19y4),
"The mixed resiiUs for itie iiiLernational orga-
iii/tT variiiblf in ihe Wl.S equation SUKK '^SI that by
separating out international organizers we may not
be accounting ior unions snch as At^ TWL'. wliicb has
a strong regional organizing suucture, or the L'SWA.
wbere organizers are on the international union's
staff, but re.sources and power are concentrated at the
regional level. Thus tbe variable may not consistently
act as a proxy for organizer training and the commit-
ment ol resources across all tinions.
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imions that run more aggressive campaigns,
bnt they also may have had to work much
harder and be much better organizers tban
their white male counterparts in order to
prove themselves to tbeir fellow staff and to
the leaders of their unions.
Conclusion and Implications
This study demonstrates the value of
moving beyond the narrow database of the
NLRB to obtain data on bargaining unit
demographics, employer and union char-
acteristics, organizer and negotiator back-
ground, union tactics, and employer tactics
beyond those on wbich charges were filed.
In my analysis, the union tactic variables,
both individually and as a group, are im-
portant determinants of union organizing
success. This result suggests that many
unions could improve their organizing suc-
cess if ihey adopted a ratik-and-file organiz-
ing strategy.
F()r most unions, that would involve a
dramatic change in their organizing prac-
tice. All of tbe rank-and-file organizing
tactics investigated in tbis study were used
by less than a third of tbe caiTipaigns in the
sample. If all the organizers Iiad employed
elements of rank-and-file intensive cam-
paigns such as representative committees,
housecalls, rank-and-file volunteers, build-
ing for the first contract, solidarity days,
and a focus on new issues, the percentage
of elections won by unions, including those
held in large units, would have been signifi-
cantly higher.
If more unions begin to frequently use a
rank-and-file intensive organizing strategy,
the implications for the labor movement
may go well beyond increasing union certi-
fication election win rates; for if significant
numbers of workers join the labor move-
ment through campaigns using these strat-
egies and tactics, the face and very nature
of the U.S. labor movement could change.
Not only would unions be organizing more
women and people of color, bul regardless
of background or industi-y, union members
coming out of a .successful rank-and-flle
intensive campaign are likely to hold the
union to higher standards regarding botb
internal union democracy and union per-
formance than are union members who
were organized thrt)ugh more traditional
election campaigns.
What these findings make clear is that
union organizing strategy and tactics mat-
ter a great deal in determining certification
election outcomes. In tbe coming years, as
tbe new leadership of the AFL-CIO com-
mits millions of dollars in staff and re-
sources toward the running of aggressive
NLRB, community-based, and industry-
based campaigns, industrial relations re-
search can play an important role in criti-
cally evaluating the impact and effective-
ness of these organizing initiatives.
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